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The Change of Russian PoliTiCal Regime 
fRom The “WhiTe RevoluTion”  
To PResidenTial eleCTion (2012–2018)1
The fall of the “White Revolution,” the mass demonstration against the forged presi-
dential election in autumn and winter 2011/2012, was closely connected with the 
processes of ruling class evolution. Then, Dmitrij Miedwiediew’s coterie was sub-
stantially marginalized. In turn, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federa-
tion (FSB, in Russian: Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации 
– ФСБ), which had played a crucial role in quelling political demonstrations and 
fragmentizing opposition, started to gain the increasing clout in the political regime. 
The next junctures were the decisions concerning the annexation of Crimea made 
in February 2014 and the beginning of the appropriation of the Donbass. They were 
desperate attempts by Kremlin to uphold the Russian sphere of influence in the so-
called “near abroad” (Götz, 2017; Rywkin, 2015: 229; Rak, 2017d: 984). These de-
cisions were to allow Russia to maintain its regional power (Forsberg, Pursiainen, 
2017: 220; Gardner, 2016: 490). Nonetheless, not only did they start the degradation 
of Russia’s position in the international environment (including the state’s exclusion 
from the G8), but they also became significant factors in changing Russian political 
regime and contributed to the political structure’s alterations which were already 
underway.
The fall of the “White Revolution” was the first factor that affected the change of 
the contemporary Russian political regime (White, McAllister, 2016; Chaisty, White-
field, 2013; Robertson, 2013; Bikbov, 2012). Noteworthy, this contentious event co-
incided with the end of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term. The second factor, 
which emerged simultaneously to the first, was the dissolution of the pro-occidental 
technocrats who held influence in the Kremlin decision-making elites. The symbol of 
this dissolution process was the rejection of Skolkovo initiative as an alternative to 
Silicon Valley (Rowe, 2014; Kinossian, Morgan, 2014).
1 This paper is a result of the research project “Contemporary Russia: Between Authoritarian-
ism and Totalitarianism” funded by National Science Centre, Poland. The research grant number: 
2015/19/B/HS5/02516.
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This article fills in a gap in the specialist literature on Putin’s Russia. Even though 
current studies describe Russian politics and identify some of the features of Putin’s 
political regime (Greene, Robertson, 2017: 1802; Slinko et al., 2017: 26; Umland, 
2017: 465; Mendras, 2017: 1489; Gel’man, 2015; Tafel, 2014), there is no analysis that 
sheds light on the essential features of the system after the “White Revolution.” Rus-
sian political regime after this mass mobilization is understudied whereas this caesura 
is significant for our understanding of the changes of the political system and the cur-
rent structural dynamics in contemporary Russian public discourse.
meThodologiCal assumPTions foR The ReseaRCh
As mentioned, the article covers the gap in the specialist literature. It aims to detect 
changes of the Russian political regime after the fall of the “White Revolution” and 
to account for why and how the system changed over time. So, the article strives 
to make a methodological, theoretical, and empirical contribution to the field of 
study on the dynamics of non-democratic regimes, and especially the nature of the 
alterations within Putin’s Russia (Petrone, 2011; Bogaards, 2009; Mirskii, 2003; 
Zaslavsky, 2003). The research field is the Russian political system which is de-
termined by its three aspects: structure of political institutions, political awareness 
of public issues, and political mobilization during Putin’s third term. The research 
makes use of qualitative analysis of sources and draws upon the critical analysis of 
the recent news. It applies Roman Bäcker’s analytical device in the form of a mod-
el that consists of the three continua whose extreme points are the indicators of 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism respectively in order to capture the essential 
features of Putin’s political system. According to this model, bureaucracy or silo-
viki, emotional mentality, and mass apathy are typical of authoritarianism. In turn, 
state-party apparatus, totalitarian gnosis, and controlled mass mobilization are the 
essential symptoms of totalitarianism (Bäcker, 2011: 72). This paper scrutinizes how 
Russian political regime evolved from the “White Revolution” to the beginning of 
Putin’s fourth term. It tests the hypothesis that the system most likely evolved from 
a soft to hard military authoritarianism which then moved towards a hybrid regime. 
The hybrid regime might have been made of the elements of authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism.
sTaTe-PaRTy aPPaRaTus
This part of the article concentrates on Russian state-party apparatus. The reconfigu-
ration of the so-called Kremlin-towers decision elite structure in 2012–2014 brought 
about the enhancement of the power structures such as the FSB, the military-industrial 
complex and the reduction of the role of the Ministry of the Interior (e.g., Rossgwardia 
creation) in the decision-making authority. Thus, the remaining institutional pressure 
groups began to play a considerably smaller role in the political structure than they 
used to have in the past (Епифанова, 2012; Епифанова, 2014). The beginning of the 
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conflict with Ukraine in February 2014 prolonged military operations in the Donbass 
(Bukkvoll, 2016: 267; Davies, 2016: 726). Additionally, then, the military interven-
tion in Syria further increased the role of the power structures, and more broadly the 
military-industrial complex in the state (Kozhanov, 2014). Due to the mixed nature of 
Russian participation in the Donbass fighting, such as the large role of informal institu-
tions and activities in the formation of political party fighting squads from volunteers, 
and participation of military troops the role and the scope of activities of the secret 
political police (the FSB) increased significantly.
The alteration of the policy towards the non-systemic opposition resulted in the 
further increase of the FSB’s role in Russia. Therefore, the mass demonstrations in 
Moscow in 2011–2012, combined with the morally motivated systemic delegitimi-
zation greatly contributed to the growth of the political systems instability (Lankina, 
Skovoroda, 2017: 270; Oleinik, 2013: 77; Koesel, Bunce, 2012: 403). For the pur-
pose of removing this menace, the decision-making elite had to extend the intensity 
of the processes of marginalization of the political opposition. This then led to the 
increase of repression, surveillance, and preventive measures. Thereby, the role of 
the FSB and other institutions geared towards stabilizing political order by means of 
state control expanded substantially. The escalating role of police structures was also 
a consequence of the strategy of increasing the level of loyalty of the bureaucratic 
state apparatus towards the decision-making center. One of the mechanisms of this 
strategy was the selective repression of the very high officers of this apparatus. As 
a result of the repression, the judges handed down prison sentences on the basis of 
corruption allegations. In November 2012, Anatoly Serdyukov’s close associate was 
arrested on the charge of corruption. Then, Serdyukov was dismissed from the func-
tion of the Minister of Defense of Russia. The decision on the deposal of the first 
civil defense minister was considered the military sector’s victory (Anatoly Serdyu-
kov, 2012). The next indicators of this tendency were the arrest of Governor Nikita 
Bielykh in 2016 (Reuters Staff, 2016) and the sentencing of the Minister of Eco-
nomic Development Alexei Ulyukaev in 2017 (Walker, 2017). Each of these cases 
can be explained in relation to the specific circumstances: the first of these concerns 
conflicts in the Kirov governorate (oblast’s), and in the second, the intentional ac-
tion of Rosneft President Igor Sechin is to be considered. Nevertheless, in each of 
them, the role of police structures, including the FSB, was vital. Furthermore, the 
substantial growth of repressiveness against the senior officials of the state apparatus 
has become glaringly apparent.
Let us move towards approaching the question if the bureaucratic-military appara-
tus transformed into a totalitarian party-state apparatus in Putin’s Russia. This question 
can be answered through the analysis of the two processes. The first is the institution-
alization of the subordination of the broadly understood sphere of social organizations, 
including other political parties, to the Kremlin. The second one is the scope of the 
formation and advocacy of the political party fighting squads.
Note should be taken, the activities of the All Russia People’s Front (in Russian: 
Общероссийский народный фронт) also contributed to the change of Russian politi-
cal regime. This organization was established in 2011 to unite all the pro-system social 
organizations, i.e., associations of entrepreneurs, trade unions, veterans’ organizations, 
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youth and women’s associations. The major task of the All Russia People’s Front was, 
however, to propose the candidates of United Russia (in Russian: Едйная Россйя, tr. 
Yedinaya Rossiya) in the elections to the Duma (Reuter, 2017: 107–158). However, 
until 2013, this Front was active to a relatively low extent. After registering and chang-
ing its name in 2014, there were no significant press releases about the fronts activity. 
For the most part, the All Russia People’s Front’s candidates started from United Rus-
sia’s list, or, being formally independent candidates, were institutionally associated 
with this party during the term of office (Malle, 2016: 200). Through the system of as-
signing tasks and supervising high-ranking civil servants, this organization became an 
institution forcing total compliance with Putin (Stanovaya, 2016). Thus, the president 
could dramatically increase its power to the typical position of a totalitarian leader 
(Ehret, 2007: 1236). Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any activism of the All Rus-
sia People’s Front officers except for rare meetings with President Putin. Putin’s pro-
ponents did not consider this organization a career path in the political system. It was 
much easier to them to pursue a career path in the political structure within the already 
existing vertical mobility paths.
Russia’s political party fighting squads cannot be equated with the groups of con-
tract killers serving in Chechen armed forces. The last ones fairly resemble the Latin 
American or Filipino “death squads” which are the armed state formations employing 
terror as a means to evade the menaces to the ruling elite. Indeed, such tactics were 
rarely used in Russia. However, let us remind the most known cases were the murders 
of Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 (Roudakova, 2009: 412) and Boris Nemtsov in 2015 
(Lipman, 2016: 341) which indicate that the tactics were in use.
In Russia, the political party fighting squads include two major organizations: the 
National Liberation Movement (NLM; in Russian: Национально-освободительное 
движение) and the SERB (South East Radical Block) movement. The former headed 
by Jewgienij Aleksiejewicz Fiodorow is an organization not seeking to get a legal sta-
tus. Fiodorow is a member of the Duma and at the same time a member of the Political 
Council of United Russia (Центральный штаб нод, 2018). The NLM has its official 
website, gives the personal composition of its management and presents its program 
whose key slogan is the belief that Russia is a US colony since 1991. The leaders of 
the NLM deny journalistic reports concerning the participation of the organization’s 
activists in the attacks on the oppositionists, and independent social enterprises that are 
not approved by the ruling party (Сурначева, 2014; Юдина, Альперович, 2016).
While the NLM activity is ideologically motivated by imperial anti-Western ideas 
and has patrons in the party sphere (mainly United Russia), SERB is of a slightly dif-
ferent nature. The Russian Liberation Movement SERB, formerly called the South-
East Radical Block, was created in order to fight in Ukraine with the so-called Euro-
maidan. At the end of summer 2014, the activists of this group left Ukraine and, under 
the slogan of not admitting to Euromaidan in Russia, they dealt with combating the 
opposition mainly by attacking oppositionists (including covering with green caustic 
substance, breaking cultural projects, lawsuits, participating in trials, etc.) (Loshkariov, 
Sushentsov, 2016: 71). The police had to initiate investigations, but their superiors did 
not want perpetrators to be sentenced. Even if the proceedings against SERB activists 
were initiated, they were rapidly invalidated because the SERB was under the tutelage 
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of the officer of the Center for the Interior Ministry’s Anti-Extremism Center, Major 
Alexei Okopny (Бывший активист SERB, 2017; Анастасия Михайлова, 2017).
The lively activity and the type of political party fighting squads influence the na-
ture of Russian political regime. Due to the diverse reactions of oppositionists and 
independent journalists (from strengthening Alexei Navalny’s will to fight to Julia 
Łatyninoj’s decision to emigrate), it is very difficult to determine the level of effec-
tiveness coming from the political party fighting squads’ tactics of intimidation. Un-
doubtedly, these fighting squads are not of mass character, and thus, although they 
strengthen the level of political conformism, they are not able to interact in the same 
ways as mass political protests do for example. Thus, the party fighting squads were 
not used in 2017 during mass protests organized by Alexei Navalny.
The role and dominance of the military complex and political police structures in 
the state have been clearer since 2014. This is a general observation that does not reflect 
the complexity of the relationships between the very diverse functional, territorial, and 
institutional political forces within the apparatus of the Russian Federation. However, 
the conclusion resulting from this domination is quite obvious, i.e., during Putin’s third 
term, military authoritarianism was a dominant type of the political regime (Rochlitz, 
2015: 59; White, 2018: 130). The existing few, and marginal structures typical of the 
party-state apparatus do not change the above general conclusion.
BeTWeen emoTional PoliTiCal menTaliTy  
and PoliTiCal gnosis
This part of the article deals with political awareness in contemporary Russia by lo-
cating it on the continuum determined by emotional political mentality and political 
gnosis. Studying political awareness may cause difficulties to the students of Russian 
political regime because of the co-existence of four Russias in spatial terms, as dis-
cussed by Natalia Zubarewicz and her co-workers (Зубаревич, 2010; 2003; Липский, 
2014; Zubarewicz, Horbowski, 2014). An undoubted fact is the very high level of ac-
ceptance in relation to Putin’s post as president. The level of acceptance and trust in 
politicians who perform public functions in democratic states exceeds the norm. By 
2014, more than 75 percent of the populace, and especially after the annexation of 
Crimea, showed up high levels of acceptance. Between March 2014 and June 2015, 
these levels fluctuated between 80 and 89 percent, before going down between 84 and 
81 percent from February 2017 to November 2017 (Levada-Center, 2017; Nardelli, 
Rankin, Arnett, 2015; Smyth, 2014). Such a high level of acceptance stemmed from 
many reasons, especially effective efforts of specialists in creating the public image, 
efficient performance of the role of a strong and determined leader overseeing his sub-
ordinates, skillfully upholding the myth of “the good tsar punishing bad officials” and 
many others. Since 2014, the image of a “strong leader” has been supplemented by the 
myth of the savior of the enslaved nations (Rak, 2017b), the creator of the great super-
power Russia regaining its position in the world, and a determined leader effectively 
fighting the enemies (Hutcheson, Petersson, 2016: 1108; Tempest, 2016: 101; Bäcker, 
2011). However, the figure of Mega-Anthropos typical of totalitarian political gnosis 
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(Rak, 2017c) appears very rarely and is socially marginalized (Клип «Мой Путин», 
2018).
Regardless of the popularity of the positive Stalin myth, the image of the current 
president is more convergent with the myth of the tsar than of being the successor of 
Lenin (Tismaneanu, 2016: 744). It should be stressed, however, that it does not follow 
a high level of personal legitimacy. This type of theoretical category cannot be used to 
describe the current political structure because of the personal non-empowerment of 
the president’s function.
One more question ought to be addressed here, namely, to what extent is the split-
ting (also called black-and-white thinking or all-or-nothing thinking) common in Rus-
sian society, and does this create a contrast by creating distinctions between the “we” 
and the “they”? (Bäcker, 2007; Rak, 2017b)? Yuri Levada Analytical Center’s research 
done in 2016 indicates that 80 percent of Russians are convinced that Russia has en-
emies. Moreover, 75 percent of them consider the broadly understood West as the ma-
jor enemy. Such a high level of perception of the world in black and white categories, 
i.e., the good and the bad, coincides with the influence of mass media (Levada-Center, 
2016) in shaping public opinion. A small percentage of Russians claimed that the tele-
vision was their sole source of information on public matters, which in Russia, regard-
less of the form of ownership is completely subordinated to the Kremlin (Babayan, 
2017; Bäcker, 2015: 105–112), except for the niche and exclusive programs available 
on the Internet TV channel Dozhd.
Since 2012, with the increase in the range of repressive measures against the non-
state forms of civic organization, a change has been noticed in the language used for 
public statements. Then, new words appeared and some others from the old days re-
turned to the public discourse. The extent of the intensity of this phenomenon went up 
after February 2014 with the (re)introduction of some terms, e.g., inostrannyje agienty 
(foreign spies). There were also the words like the fifth column, traitors of the nation 
and nieżiełatielnyje (undesirable) organizations (Павлова, 2014) etc.
Although these terms appeared for the first time in many years during Putin’s March 
speech to the National Assembly in connection with the irredentist “Return of Crimea 
to the Homeland,” these words ceased to appear from the autumn of 2014 (Ambrosio, 
2016; Teper, 2016; Rak, 2017a). These only re-appeared in the exceptional cases such 
as in the statements made by president Ramzan Kadyrov in 2016, where he suggested 
that the enemies of the nation should undergo psychiatric treatment (Meduza, 2016).
The derogatory vocabulary was used to describe Ukrainians, in particular, Ukrain-
ian politicians who did not submit to the Kremlin. The negative emotions attached to 
this vocabulary and the concepts behind these words derived from the lexicon of World 
War II which entered the public discourse throughout that period (Pasitselska, 2017). 
The contextual analysis of the word “ukrfascist,” which was commonly used in the 
central Russian press, indicates that it is treated as an insult with no semantic field. It 
was a classic label employed to confound the object of the utterance.
As the result of the very high level of aversion to Ukraine and its treatment by many 
Russians as a hostile state, the level of disapproval alongside the negative stereotypes, 
functions in feeding back into the negativity surrounding the issues. These elements 
of the Russian political discourse are the manifestation of totalitarian gnosis. Let us 
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conclude that after the fall of the “White Revolution” political awareness was largely 
typical of the fundamentalist way of thinking with the minor elements of totalitarian 
gnosis.
The PuBliC BeTWeen The mass aPaThy  
and ConTRolled moBilizaTion
This part of the paper discusses the activities of the public by locating Russia on the 
continuum whose extreme points are mass apathy and controlled mobilization. The 
capacity of the state apparatus and the activating potential of the ruling party to or-
ganize controlled political mobilization in contemporary Russia was relatively low. 
Demonstrations and other contentious performances staged by United Russia, even 
with the use of administrative resources, were not usually numerous. Additionally, the 
turnout of the manifestations of support for the annexation of Crimea was relatively 
small (“Crimea is ours” (Suslov, 2014)).
There are, however, two significant exceptions. The first of these is the anniversary 
of the end of World War II, the only anniversary that is massively celebrated. Participa-
tion in this celebration originates from free will rather than from a forced or control-
led form of participation. The end of the Great Patriotic War (in Russian: Великая 
Отечественная война) on May 9, 1945, is the only historical event accepted by all 
political groups and ideological currents in Russia. On the one hand, the event serves 
as the confirmation of the Kremlin’s superpower position. On the other, it also marks 
the end of the huge hecatomb of the people living in the Soviet Union. The second 
exception is the mass gathering which almost covers the entire population inhabiting 
Chechnya. This republic is significantly different from other regions of Russia, and 
also belongs to a different type of political regime. Chechnya can be found, also due 
to the significant level of meeting other criteria (Hughes, Sasse, 2016), a totalitarian 
political entity.
In turn, the results of the elections to the State Duma in 2016 indicate a reverse 
process, especially with regard to Russian capitals. Turnouts in Moscow and St. Peters-
burg did not exceed 40 percent (Выборы, 2016; see: Винокуров, 2017). Regardless 
of refraining from falsifying results, one of the reasons for such a low turnout may be 
related to apathy in regard to voting and the election process. It is an essential feature 
of the policy of the authoritarian decision-making elite that is afraid of the undesirable 
forms of political activity of the social masses, especially during their transformation 
into a proto-civic society.
In 2012–2018, the Russian society was much closer to the ideal type of social 
apathy than to its antinomy in the form of the controlled and mass social mobilization. 
Although the attempts to increase the level of the mobilization characteristic to totali-
tarianism occurred since March 2014, they were discontinued after a few months.
Let us emphasize that mass political protests took place in Russia in March, June, 
September, and November 2017 (Light, 2017). Though, for the first time, they covered 
not only all the Russian cities with more than a million inhabitants but also a significant 
part of the regions’ capitals and smaller towns. Participation in them was almost ex-
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clusively limited to the young generation (15–25 years old people). The consequence 
of the emergence of this type of mass political protests was the Kremlin’s decision-
making strategy of increasing the level of political apathy among the social groups that 
would be most willing to participate in the protests.
* * *
The analysis shows that Russian political regime is a hard military authoritarianism. It 
evolved from a soft to hard military authoritarianism and then towards a hybrid regime 
made of the elements of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. After the beginning of 
the conflict with Ukraine, few totalitarian components were visible. They occurred es-
pecially in the sphere of political awareness in the form of totalitarian political gnosis. 
In addition, the indicators of totalitarianism started to disappear from September 2014, 
except for the totalitarian political gnosis in the political discourse. The political party 
fighting squads typical of totalitarianism functioned incessantly.
Just after the beginning of the war with Ukraine (from February to the summer 
months of 2014), the aspirations to build the totalitarian political gnosis into the politi-
cal discourse, as well as the attempts to incur mass mobilization, were clearly visible. 
Importantly, these were considerably reduced since autumn 2014. The started inter-
vention in Syria might have been one of the reasons for this tendency. However, the 
lack of a significant social endorsement of the totalitarian political discourse and mass 
mobilization shaped the political regime. A large part of Russians, mainly ethnic, did 
not accept totalitarian institutions, language, and social behavior. It does not mean, 
however, that these components of the political regime did not exist.
The very high level of the declared political conformism with the simultaneously 
increasing axiological, personal, and system de-legitimization as well as depletion of 
other resources of the ruling elite prompt a question concerning the level of stability 
of the political system. Thus, the research indicates that Russia’s hard military authori-
tarianism (with the uncommon elements of soft totalitarianism) is declining.
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aBsTRaCT
How did Russian political regime change after the “White Revolution”? The article makes 
a methodological, theoretical, and empirical contribution to the field of studies on the dynamics 
of non-democratic regimes, and especially the nature of the alterations within Putin’s Russia. 
The research field is the Russian political system determined by its three aspects: structure of 
political institutions, political awareness of public issues, and political mobilization between 
the “White Revolution” and the beginning of Putin’s fourth term. The paper solves the research 
problems by employing the qualitative analysis of sources and drawing on the critical analysis 
of the recent news. The analysis benefits from the use of Roman Bäcker’s analytical device, 
a theoretical framework made of the three continua whose extreme points are the indicators of 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism respectively. The research tool is to identify the essential 
features of Putin’s political regime. According to this model, bureaucracy or siloviki, emotional 
mentality, and social apathy are typical of authoritarianism. In turn, state-party apparatus, to-
talitarian gnosis, and controlled mass mobilization are the symptoms of totalitarianism. This 
article researches how the Russian political regime evolved from the “White Revolution” to the 
beginning of Putin’s fourth term. It tests the hypothesis that the system most likely evolved from 
a soft to hard military authoritarianism. The regime might have moved towards a hybrid regime 
made of the elements of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It formulates the conclusion the 
Russian political regime is a hard military authoritarianism. After the fall of the “White Revo-
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lution”, most notably after the annexation of Crimea, few totalitarian elements were visible, 
mostly in the sphere of social awareness in the form of totalitarian political gnosis. In addition, 
the indicators of totalitarianism started to disappear from September 2014, especially the ele-
ments of totalitarian gnosis in the political discourse.
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ZMIANA ROSYJSKIEGO REŻIMU POLITYCZNEGO OD „BIAŁEJ REWOLUCJI” 
do WyBoRÓW PRezydenCKiCh (2012–2018) 
 
sTReszCzenie
Jaka była istota zmian reżimu politycznego w Rosji po „Białej rewolucji”? Nowatorskie rozwią-
zanie powyższego problemu badawczego wzbogaca metodologiczne, teoretyczne i empiryczne 
płaszczyzny badań nad dynamiką przemian reżimów niedemokratycznych, a szczególnie Ro-
sji Putina. Polem badawczym jest system polityczny Rosji analizowany na trzech płaszczy-
znach: struktury instytucji politycznych, świadomości politycznej oraz aktywności społecznej 
na continuum pomiędzy sterowaną mobilizacją a apatią. Cezurami są: „Biała Rewolucja” oraz 
wybory prezydenckie w 2018 roku. Problem badawczy został rozwiązany dzięki jakościowej 
analizie źródeł i krytycznej analizie informacji. Badanie było możliwe dzięki zastosowaniu 
siatki kategorii teoretycznych autorstwa Romana Bäckera. Stworzył on trzy continua, których 
punkty ekstremalne są jednocześnie istotnościowymi kryteriami odpowiednio autorytaryzmu 
i totalitaryzmu. To narzędzie badawcze pozwala na określenie nie tylko miejsca, ale i wektora 
oraz wielkości zmian reżimu politycznego Rosji. Zgodnie z tym modelem panowanie biuro-
kracji i/lub „silovikow”, mentalność emocjonalna i apatia społeczna są cechami typowymi dla 
autorytaryzmu. Z drugiej strony panowanie aparatu partyjno-państwowego, gnoza polityczna 
i sterowana masowa mobilizacja są symptomami totalitaryzmu. Wykazano, że reżim polityczny 
w Rosji przekształcił się z miękkiego autorytaryzmu w twardy i militarny. Jednocześnie zaczął 
on mieć charakter hybrydalny, a więc łączył elementy autorytaryzmu i totalitaryzmu. Po upadku 
„Białej Rewolucji”, a szczególnie po aneksji Krymu, wyraźnie widoczne były elementy reżimu 
totalitarnego, zwłaszcza w sferze świadomości społecznej. Jednakże elementy totalitaryzmu, 
w szczególności w sferze dyskursu publicznego zaczęły zanikać po wrześniu 2014 roku. Od 
marca 2017, wraz z pierwszymi masowymi demonstracjami politycznymi, rosyjski reżim poli-
tyczny zaczął wykazywać cechy schyłkowe.
 
Słowa kluczowe: reżim polityczny, autorytaryzm, totalitaryzm, Rosja Putina

